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vi,

RESPONSE TO PARK CITY'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Two paragraphs of the Statement of Facts in Park City's Brief contain conjecture
and speculation concerning the history of the Bakers' Lot 83. They are not "facts", were
not relied upon as grounds for denying the Plat Amendment and are irrelevant to the
issues on this appeal. Specifically, Park City alleges:
Lot 83 was originally reserved for a spring and pond to be used for fire
protection ...

vJ

The springs and pond on the lot were needed for fire protection since at the
time fire hydrants did not exist in the area. At some point prior to 1993,
fire hydrants were installed in the area and the Fire Department therefore no
longer needed access to Dority Springs.
pp. 1-2 (citing R. 47, 65, 68), see also Brief, pp. 20, 21, 28, 31.
The cited pages of the record establish that these "facts" are merely assumptions
as to Lot 83 's pre-1993 uses. (R. 47, Planner Astorga: "Again, that's an assumption. I, I
don't know if that's exactly what happened"); (R. 47, Council Matsumoto: " ... my
assumption is that - there's no proof of it ... "); (R.65, 68-69, Park City's Planning Staff
"is unable to understand other reasons that may allowed [sic] the exception to the
restrictions ... the intent may have been .... ") The City Council and Mayor
acknowledged that the speculative history of Lot 83 could not be ascertained with
certainty or be referred to as "fact." See (R. 5 5.)
The following facts concerning the history of the Lot 83 are undisputed and
relevant: (1) The Bakers' lot is not subject to any CC&Rs and re-subdivision of lots is
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permitted (R. 15, ,r,r 22-23); (2) the Bakers' lot is identified as a "lot" in the CC&Rs (R.
15, ,r 24); (3) in the early 1990's Park City approved a building permit for construction of
the Bakers' home on Lot 83 (R. 65); (4) the Bakers' application satisfies all provisions of
the LMC requirements for subdivision into two lots. (R. 14-15.) Consideration about
whether Lot 83 was intended to be a buildable lot forty years ago became moot after Park
City approved the Baker's home on Lot 83. See Fox v. Park City, 2008 UT 85, ,r,r 40-42
(the ten-day period to appeal a building permit commences, at the latest, when
construction begins).

ARGUMENT IN REPLY TO APPELLEE'S BRIEF
I.

Denial of the Bakers' application for the Proposed Amendment must be
supported by substantial evidence in the record.
A. Park City does not dispute or deny that Utah Code Ann.§ 10-9a-801 (3)(b)
applies to the Bakers' application for the Proposed Amendment.
l\.1LUDMA states that a "final decision of a land use authority or an appeal

authority" must be "supported by substantial evidence in the record." Utah Code Ann.§ 109a-801 (3)(c) (emphasis added.) "Land use authority" means:
(a) A [] body, including the local legislative body, designated [] to act upon a land
use application; or
(b) If the local legislative body has not designated a [specified entity] the local
legislative body.
Utah Code Ann.§ I0-9a-103 (24). A decision to amend a plat is made by a "land use
authority." Utah Code§ 10-9a-609 (1); See Brief, p. 33 (arguing Utah Code§ 10-9a-609 is
applicable). '~Land use application" means an application required by a municipality's land
7
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~

use ordinance. Utah Code Ann.§ 10-9a-103 (23). Park City designated its City Council as
the land use authority to make final decisions for approval of final subdivision plats and
amendments. Park City Land Mgmt. Code (''LMC") § 15-7.1-6 (C).
Park City fails to acknowledge or address :rvtllJDMA's directive under§ 10-9a801 (3 )(c) that final decisions of a land use authority are subject to the substantial evidence
standard. Instead, Park City attempts to manipulate Park City's denial of the Bakers' land
use application into Utah Code § I 0-9a-801 (3 )(b), the "reasonably debatable" standard by
categorizing Park City's decision as an exercise oflegislative discretion which could have
resulted in an ordinance. Brief, pp. 5, 18.
There are at least two reasons why Section 801(3)(c) governs. First: the fact that
"final decisions of land use authority" are in a category separate from decisions involving
the exercise of legislative discretion indicates that land use applications are not intended to
be "legislative in nature", Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch, 2011 UT 50, ,r 14 ("The best
evidence of the legislature's intent is 'the plain language of the statute itself.' Thus, 'when
interpreting a statute, we assume, absent a contrary indication, that the legislature used each
term advisedly according to its ordinary and usually accepted meaning.' Additionally, we
'presume that the expression of one tenn should be interpreted as the exclusion of
another."') (emphasis added). Second, even where the decision on a land use application is
arguably legislative in nature, including because the final decision of the land use authority
id
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is made by the legislative body, 1 § 801 (3 )(c) is the more specific statutory provision
concerning decisions of land use authorities and should control over the more general § 801
(3 )(b), Keller v. Martinez, 2014 UT App 2, ,r 9 ("A basic rule of statutory construction
provides that statutes that address specific circumstances 'control over more general ones'
where those circumstances are present.") Accordingly, based on the plain language of Utah
~

Code § 10-9a-801 (3 )(c) the Court should apply the "supported by substantial evidence"
standard to Park City's decision on the Bakers' application without needing to classify Park
City's denial of the application as legislative or administrative.

B. Park City's review of the Bakers' application was administrative in nature,
even if Park City improperly considered factors reserved for legislative
decision making.

In arguing that its decision was legislative, not administrative, Park City relies on
dicta from Olsen v. Park City Mun. Corp., 2013 UT App 262, related to exhaustion of
administrative remedies and Suarez v. Grand County, 2012 UT 72. Brief, pp. 4-6. In
Olsen, the Court determined that Utah Code Ann.§ 10-9a-801(5) dealing with exhaustion of

administrative remedies related to an appeal of an ordinance applied, not§ 10-9a801(2)(a)(4) concerning land use applications. Olsen, 2013 UT App 262, ,r 7, fn. 3. Olsen
1

Simply because final review of a land use application is made by a City Council or
follows a process similar to the one in this case does not make it legislative in nature. See
Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, 115 ("The American Fork City
Development Code ... set out the administrative procedures governing land use
decisions by the City, Specifically, the Development Code establishes a Planning
Commission that has authority to make reports and recommendations concerning city
planning and development, and advise the City Council on their findings, The City
Council is not bound by the decisions of the Planning Commission and can vote for or
against any recommendations made.") (emphasis added.)
9
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noted that exhaustion of administrative remedies for an appeal of an ordinance applied
based on the fact that the decision being appealed was designated as an ordinance
'<:J

("Ordinance No. 10-08") and because the LMC defines "land use ordinance" as a
"planning, zoning, development, or subdivision ordinance of the municipality." Id.
Park City argues that Olsen should be applied here to determine that Park City's
denial of the Proposed Amendment was a legislative action.2 Brief pp. 4-5. Park City
reasons that had the Proposed Application been approved it would have resulted in an

~

enactment of an "ordinance" and, therefore, the denial of the Proposed Amendment must, as
a matter of law, also be determined to be a legislative act entitled to the reasonably
debatable standard of review. Id at p. 5 (citing Bradley v. Payson City., 2003 UT 16,113,
7, 10-13.)

Olsen is inapplicable. The dicta in footnote 3 concerned exhaustion of
administrative remedies, specifically calculation of the deadline for appeal. Olsen, 2013 UT
App 262 1 7. Olsen is silent on whether denial of an application is legislative or
administrative for the purposes of detennining whether the correct standard for appeal is
"reasonably debatable" or "supported by substantial evidence." Id. Further, Park City's

2

In Olsen Park City consistently characterized its consideration of the land use
application combining three lots into a single lot as administrative in nature. Brief of
Appellant at p. 12, Olsen (citing R. 10 [by Park City] "the Ordinance being challenged by
Plaintiffs allows specific parcels ofland to be combined into a one lot subdivision and is
more administrative in function than legislative"; R. 36-37 [By Park City]: "A
subdivision ordinance ... is specific to a lot or lots of record and establishing their
boundaries and operates akin to an administrative land use action despite its designation
as an ordinance.")
10
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assertion that the application in Olsen was "similar" to the Bakers' application/project is
unsupported and incorrect. See Brief, p. 4. Olsen concerned combining three small parcels
to allow construction of a multi-unit dwelling. 3 See Olsen v. Park City, 2016 UT App 106,

1 3.

~

Constructing a "high density" use on three small combined parcels, which was not a

permitted use in the applicable zone under the LMC and required a conditional use permit,
~

is clearly different from the Bakers' request to subdivide their one-acre lot into two fully
compliant single family lots.
Neither does Suarez support Park City's argwnent that its denial of the Bakers'
application was a legislative act. First, Park City ignores Suarez's emphasis that the
distinction between legislative and administrative actions is that legislative acts "establish[ ]
rules of general applicability" - "a law that applies to everyone within the geographical area
... or to everyone within a category of persons engaged in a particular activity ... in other
words, sets the governing standard for all cases coming within its terms." Suarez, 2012 UT
72, ,I 30. Suarez does note that an act that extends to only one or a few individuals can be
legislative, but only ''where it both governs all future cases falling under its provisions and
is based on general policy concerns rather than individual circumstances." Id. (emphasis
added) (internal quotations omitted.) Further, Suarez focused particularly on zoning
ordinances, which are clearly legislative acts. Id., ,I 31.

3

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, at p. 3, 5
(citing PC0000002, ,I,I 21-22), Civ. No. 110500209.
11
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4v

In applying the standards for detennining when an action that technically involves
one property owner can still be legislative - in that case the owner being a land
owner/developer of a 1900-acre parcel - the Court found.that: (1) the governmental actions
controlled future cases falling under its provisions because it was recorded against the
subject property, approved and incorporated by ordinance, expressly stated that it "runs with
the land" and was binding on future owners of the to-b~-developed 1900-acres, id. 132; and
(2) the "Code" of the development, which administered and guided the building of the
proposed development, imposed application of the adopted ordinance on a large number of
individuals (future owners in the development) through general rules of applicability which
allowed for administrative deviations. Id. ~133-34. Park City's conclusion that Grand
County's action on the proposed land use in Suarez and Park City's action in this case are
comparable is incorrect. Brief, p. 6 (stating the ordinance passed in Suarez was "a decision
similar in nature and effect to the [Bakers'] plat amendment considered by the Park City
Council" because it "applied only to a single owner.") The 1900-acre multi-use project in

Suarez, which was virtually its own city and was divided into five separate internal zoning
classifications, is hardly comparable to the Bakers' request to divide their one-acre lot into
two lots. See Suarez, 150.
Park City also relies on Petersen v. Riverton Ctty, 2010 UT 58, which it represents
"is much nearer in scope to the [Bakers' application for their] one-acre lot than to the 1900acre parcel in Suarez" and also illustrates that a "site-specific land-use decision" can be a
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~

law of general applicability so long as it runs with the land and applies to future owners of
the subject property. Brief, p. 8 fn 1. Park City's comparison of the "similarities" of the
project in Petersen- a 21-acre proposed project in which the developer requested rezoning4

~

into two zones allowing for two units per acre in some areas and three units per acre in
others - is misleading and unfounded as Petersen is much more similar to Suarez than it is
~

to the Bakers' application.

5

It cannot reasonably be disputed that Park City did not create new law of general
applicability in denying the Bakers' application. Park City's denial of the Bakers'
application does not run with the land. The Bakers, or any successive owners of the Bakers'
property (such as a friend of the Mayor or a member of the City Council), could submit
another application to subdivide the property at any time, and no comment or consideration
4

In Petersen, the Utah Supreme Court held that the enactment and amendment of zoning
ordinances is fundamentally legislative and declined the Plaintiffs request to consider an
application for re-zoning to be quasi-judicial in nature. Petersen, 2010 UT 58, ,r,r 10-11.
The Court determined that applying existing ordinances is a task of a completely different
character from a "request to amend an existing zoning ordinance in its entirety." Id., ,r11.
In this case, Park City was required only to apply existing ordinances to the Bakers'
application. The Bakers did not request that any zoning ordinance or other regulation of
the LMC be re-written or amended, or to otherwise perform a legislative function.
5
Park City also implies that Bradley v. Payson Ctty Corp., 2003 UT 16, is factually
similar and should be relied upon to find Park City acted legislatively in denying the
Bakers' application. Brief, p. 7 (describing Bradley as "holding that Payson City
Council's denial of a single lot rezone was a legislative act."). First, Bradley concerned a
re-zoning application, which the Utah Supreme Court has consistently held is a
legislative act regardless of the scope of the project. Bradley, 2003 UT 16, ,r,r 11, 13.
Second, the rezoning request in Bradley involved changing low density
residential/agricultural property to allow high density multi-family dwellings. Id., ,r,r 2-5.
That is a fundamental change in the nature of the use of the property, unlike the Bakers'
application.
13
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liY

from Park City's review of the Bakers' application that is the subject of this case would be
binding on the review and potential approval of any future application. A subsequent
C,

identical application could be approved under the exact same facts and would not be subject
to challenge either. That ability to discriminate willy-nilly is an open invitation to
corruption and the very definition of arbitrary decision making.
Neither is there any reason to believe that Park City's standard of consideration of
"compatibility with the direct neighborhood" applied to the Bakers' application will be
applied to any other subdivision application. Park City invented that test specifically for
denying the Bakers' application. Applying Park City's logic that its decision "runs with the
land," Brief, p. 8, every land use decision made by a municipality could theoretically impact
future owners of the subject property and would therefore "run with the land" and be
classified as legislative in nature.

~

The "compatible with the direct neighborhood" standard (i.e. whether the lot is
similar to a handful of properties located on the same side of the street) is not specified
anywhere in the LMC and there is no reason to believe that this specific criteria will be
applied to any other subdivision application. The standard that Park City literally invented
out of thin air for denying the Bakers' application clearly was based on individual
circumstances. The very definition of"neighborhood" used by Park City was lot-specific,
including only nine properties on the same side of the street while excluding residential

14
vjJ
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properties directly across the street from the Bakers' lot. 6 Other property owners within
Park City applying to subdivide will not (or at least may not) be subjected to the same
whimsically limited definition of"direct neighborhood."
To illustrate this point, consider that the Planning Commission staff posted notice of
the Bakers' application and mailed notice to property owners within 300 feet of the Bakers'
property (R. 72) as required by LMC § 15-1-21. Accordingly, in this case, Park City
Planning staff was required to provide notice of the Bakers' application to "neighbors"
which Park City did not deem to be within the Bakers' "direct neighborhood," including
properties directly across the street from and within 300 feet of the Bakers' lot.
Second, Park City makes an argument that because the LMC provides administrative
deviations from the Plat Amendment Ordinance its denial of the Bakers' application was
legislative. Brief, p. 9 ("Specifically, if Council had approved the ordinance, Appellants
would have been able to apply for a variance or conditional use permit, which are both

~

administrative actions.") That argument makes no sense. There was no need for the Bakers
to apply for a variance or conditional use permit because it is undisputed that the requested
subdivision satisfied literally all requirements of the SF zone. (R. 15, ,r 20.) Simply
because the LMC provides for administrative deviations, which may or may not be
6

Park City alleges that it included properties across the street in its definition of direct
neighborhood. Brief, p. 25. Park City's assertion is not supported by the record. (R. 16,
"In terms of compatibility the lots on the same side of the street from Monitor Drive to
Lucky John Drive be [sic] included in the compatibility comparison as Little Kate Road
separates the character of each subdivision ranging from Racquet Club Condos to Park
Meadows V to Holiday Ranchettes subdivisions.").
15
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~

applicable to other subdivision applicants, is irrelevant to whether Park City acted
administratively or legislatively in denying the Baker's application.
Third, Park City's denial of the Bakers' application was primarily based on broad
policy concerns - specifically public input received during revision of the General Plan that
residents are generally anti-"in-fill" in established neighborhoods. Such consideration was
inappropriate for what should have been an administrative action. Essentially, Park City
argues that it may select which standard to apply in how it chooses to handle a land use
application, either legislatively or administratively, without any consideration of how the
application must be treated as a matter oflaw. Park City is effectively doing away with the
"reasonably debatable" versus "substantial evidence" dichotomy under l\.1LUDMA simply
by choosing to treat all land use applications as "legislative" and thereby self-electing
"reasonably debatable" review by the Courts.
~

That is not how it works. l\1LUDMA expressly provides direction that final
decisions on land use applications are entitled to review under the "substantial evidence"
standard. Park City should not be permitted to unilaterally reduce the standard ofjudicial
scrutiny simply by labeling its action as legislative or choosing to (improperly) treat
administrative applications as legislative action. To be legislative in nature the action must
create a new law of general applicability, which in this case it did not and would not have
had even if the application had been approved.
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In sum, while Park City argues that its act of denying the Bakers' application was

iJ

legislative under Suarez and Peterson, each of these cases is easily distinguishable because
they involved much larger scale development and requests for re-zoning. Unlike those
cases, the Bakers' application concerned only the dividing of their one-acre lot into two lots
which satisfied zoning regulations and would not have required changing or implementing
~

new law of general applicability.
C. Park City's decision should not be given deference as "at least arguably
legislative."

Park City argues that when land use decisions are "difficult to classify," courts
should give deference to the local legislative bodies by giving controlling significance to the
form of the underlying governmental decision. Brief, p. 10 (quoting Suarez, 2012 UT 72, ,I

~

41 ). The Bakers' application is not one such "difficult to classify" decision and is clearly
administrative. While Utah courts have stated that zoning decisions are often difficult to
classify, and therefore require a more in-depth review to determine whether the decision is
administrative or legislative in nature, there is no Utah precedent where a land use
application comparable to the Bakers' (creating one additional single family lot complied

~

with all existing zoning regulations) was deemed "difficult to classify" or "legislative" in
nature. See Suarez, 2012 UT 72, ,I 20 ("some zoning decisions are more difficult to classify,

~

as they involve acts in the gray area between clearly legislative and clearly executive. Thus,
a second helpful guideline is that when land use decisions 'are at least arguably legislative,'
~

we 'give understandable deference to the formal nature of the governmental body involved
17
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in making them and the formal nature of the zoning ordinance.") (emphasis added); See

Carter v. Lehi City, 2012 UT 2, ,r 75 (site-specific zoning is arguably legislative in two
situations: when a decision is made by a city council that possesses only legislative
authority and when adopting a new zoning classification.) Accordingly, there is no need for
the Court to contort Park City's denial of the Bakers' application into being "arguably
legislative."
If the Court chooses to entertain Park City's "arguably legislative" argument, Park

City's reasoning still fails. First, Park City cites to opinions in which Utah courts found an
action was arguably legislative because the ordinances in question expressly stated that the
governing body was acting legislatively. Brief, p. 10-11 (citing Save Beaver Cnty. v.

Beaver Cnty., 2009 UT 8, ,r,r 18-20 and Suarez, 2012 UT 72, ,r 44.) However, in this case
there was no ordinance resulting from Park City's denial, and there certainly was not an
ordinance expressly stating that the denial constituted legislative action. Inclusion of the
term "adversely affect health, safety and welfare" in the notice of denial, or informing the
Bakers therein that appeal of the "Final Action" must be made to the Court, likewise does
not ipso facto make Park City's action legislative.
Park City argues that its decision was arguably legislative because appeals therefrom
were required to be made to the District Court. Brief, p. 11. LMC § 15-1-18, General
Provisions and Procedures, concerns appeals and reconsideration process for all land use
decisions - not simply legislative actions - and instructs that decisions made by
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agencies/commissions other than the local legislative body also be appealed to the District

~

Court for review. See e.g. LMC § 15-1-18 (C) ("The City or any Person [] adversely
affected by a Final Action by the Planning Commission on appeals of Staff action may
petition the District Court in Summit County ....")
Park City also argues, without authority, that because :MLUDMA provides that a
land use authority "may" approve an application for plat amendment, such discretion is
indicative oflegislative, not administrative, action. Brief, p. 14, 32-33. Permissive
language that a land use authority "may" approve an application rather than "shall" approve

~

an application has no application to the determination of whether an action is legislative or
administrative. Utah Code § 10-9a-608, "Vacating, altering, or amending a subdivision
plat", is far more illustrative on the application process than § 609, and the procedure
outlined therein more closely resembles an administrative land use decision than a
legislative one. For example,§ 608 requires that owners of the portion of the plat proposed
to be amended be mailed notice of the application at least ten (10) calendar days before the
land use authority may approve the application, noting, however, that if the application is to
subdivide a lot belonging to one owner which will not result in a violation of a land use
ordinance or a development condition, that no public hearing is necessary. 7 Utah Code §
10-9a-608 (1)-(2).
7

Park City argues that approval of a subdivision plat amendment is, and should be, more
restrictive and discretionary than the approval of an original plat due to the expectations
of neighboring land owners within the development (attempting to explain why, under
l\1LUDMA, an original subdivision plat "shall" be granted if it complies with zoning

~
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In sum, the Bakers' application does not involve re-zoning or any other "gray area"
concerning both legislative and administrative functions and there is no need to consider
whether Park City's action could "arguably" be considered somewhat legislative. If the
Bakers' application, which is clearly administrative in nature, is treated as "arguably
legislative," all land use decisions are subject to the s~e treatment and there is no purpose
in distinguishing the types of decisions that must be afforded review under the heightened
"supported by substantial evidence" standard.
II.

Park City's denial of the Bakers' application does not withstand either the
"reasonably debatable" or "supported by substantial evidence" standard of
review.
A. Park City fails to demonstrate that its denial was reasonably debatable
when it ignores its express findings upon which the denial was based and
instead focuses on speculation concerning the Bakers' lot which was not
the basis of Park City's decision.

While the Bakers dispute that the "reasonably debatable" standard is properly
applied to Park City's denial of the Bakers' application, even ifit were the proper standard,
Park City fails to demonstrate that its denial was reasonably debatable or that it was not

ordinances while an amendment "may" be granted). Brief, pp. 31-32. However, Utah
Code § 10-9a-608 (2) clearly distinguishes certain types of limited plat amendments that
do not directly impact other, non-consenting owners within the subdivision by removing
the necessity of a public hearing for those types of applications. These limited
applications which do not require amendment to the entire plat or a portion thereof also
are not required to obtain signatures of other owners of the entire plat or portion of the
plat to be amended. See Utah Code§ 10-9a-608 (4). The Utah legislature's different
treatment of plat amendments effecting just one parcel or property owner ( or more than
one consenting owner) as opposed to amendments which would require amendment to
the entire plat or sections of the plat, implies that amendments of such limited scope
should not be treated as altering the entire existing subdivision as suggested by Park City.
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arbitrary and capricious. Specifically, in its Brief, Park City devotes three pages to
discussing why its denial of the Bakers' application was reasonably debatable and not
arbitrary and capricious. Brief, pp. 15-17. In those three pages, Park City fails to discuss
any of Park City's four "conclusions of law" upon which its denial was based and further
fails to discuss the 63 paragraphs of purported factual findings upon which those
conclusions are based. Brief, pp. 15-17; compare (R. 14-17.)
Instead, Park City argues that it "considered" various categories of information
which constitute the "evidence supporting the Council's decision." Brief, p. 17. However,
most of the information cited by Park City in its Brief were not included in "facts" upon
which its decision were based, including the following: (1) "Park City Council considered
information regarding the historical intent of the subdivision," compare Notice of Denial,
Findings of Fact (R. 14-17, findings of fact are devoid of any reference to the historical
intent of the subdivision); (2) "the nature of the Holiday Ranchettes Subdivision with its
open space and grazing areas," compare id. (findings of fact are devoid of any reference to
open space and grazing areas or "nature" of subdivision); (3) ''the location of the property
with regard to other subdivisions" compare id. (the only findings of fact referencing other
subdivisions is that the Bakers' lot is "on the outer rim of the subdivision" and that Park
Meadows No. 5 subdivision is located across the street, 1128-30); (4) ''the City's General
Plan" compare id. (findings of fact are devoid of any reference to the General Plan); (5)
"environmental concerns," compare id. (Park City found no significant "environmental
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impacts from this application," il 63) and; (6) "fiscal impacts," compare id. (Park City
found "no significant fiscal ... impacts from this application," il 63) .
Park City also references that it considered "compatibility." However, the single
page of the Record it cites to does not explain the test for compatibility or the evidence upon
which Park City relied in determining purported "non-compatibility." Brief, p 17 (citing R.
54.) Similarly, Park City argues that the Council had concerns about ''the fit of Lot 83 if
further subdivided" and the "impact that increasing density would have on their
C1'

neighborhood," without any reference to the Record or any explanation as to how "keeping
the fit" of the lot or preventing one additional home on the one-acre lot could possibly cause
any legitimate concern or harm public interests. Brief, p. 17.
B. Park City fails to demonstrate that its denial was supported by
substantial evidence in the record.

Park City makes vague assertions that there is substantial evidence supporting its
decision in the record, yet, Park City largely fails to cite to such evidence. Brief, pp. 18-25.
First, Park City argues that there is substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that the
viP

Bakers' proposed amendment is not consistent with State and City law. Brief, pp. 18-19.
Park City quotes the LMC's definition of"good cause," which requires a "case by case"
(i.e., administrative) analysis of several hopelessly vague factors, including "providing
positive benefits and mitigating negative impacts" among other things. Brief, p. 19 ( citing
LMC § 15-15-1.114.) Park City then cites to four categories of "evidence" which it argues
supports Park City's finding ''that there was not good cause for the plat amendment,"
22
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including: (1) "the evidence regarding lot size and depth"; (2) "the evidence regarding the
nature of other properties in the Holiday Ranchettes Subdivision and that the other lots in
the Subdivision cannot be subdivided"; (3) "the evidence regarding the history of the lot,
subdivision, and HOA"; and (4) public input regarding the amendment and increases in
density." Brief, p. 19, see also p. 22 (a similar analysis in regard to "compatibility.")
Regarding the first category, Park City initially considered the size and shape of the
Bakers' lot, as well as the size and shapes of nearby properties, and ultimately concluded
that it would only compare the overall size and depth of the Bakers' lot to other lots within
Holiday Ranchettes. Park City provides no explanation as to how the limited size/depth
comparison relates to "good cause." The depth of the Bakers' lot and its size of one-acre
are irrelevant to the factors considered under the "good cause" analysis, including the
"health, safety and welfare of the Park City community" or "providing public amenities and
benefits." Brief, p. 19. From a street view the depth of the Bakers' property is
imperceptible. The width ofLot 83 (a characteristic Park City chose to ignore) is much
more relevant to the fit of the property. See (R. 114, "depth would only be an issue from an
aerial view.") However, Park City chose not to focus on what the property actually looks
like to passersby (instead of flyersover) because doing so would ineluctably result in a
finding of compatibility. (R. 113. )8
8

"Planner Astorga did not believe this was an appropriate study [on width of lots]
because the Staff would not be able to find incompatibility because [the proposed
amendment] would be consistent with the other structures in the neighborhood; and it
would meet the CC&Rs and the LMC."
23
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While Park City argues that "good cause" involves "preserving the character of the
neighborhood" and "promoting excellent and sustainable design," Park City has never
~

explained how allowing the Bakers to subdivide their lot would detract from the character of
the neighborhood or negatively impact design when the proposed amendment is zoning
compliant and consistent with properties along the same road (Little Kate) which come in
various shapes and sizes. Brief, p. 20. Prior to the Bakers' application, Park City never
defined "neighborhood" as consisting of properties located on the same side of the street
while excluding homes directly across the street. Neither has Park City defined a
"neighborhood" as consisting of only the platted subdivision in which the property is
located when a property is on the "outskirts of the subdivision" (in Park City's words).
There is no support in the LMC for compatibility analysis to be applied to the "direct
neighborhood," which term was invented during consideration of the Bakers' application.
See Brief, p. 24.9 There simply is no basis for Park City to carve out which properties it will

consider, and which neighboring properties to ignore, in order to support a desired finding
of incompatibility with or failure to preserve the character of the neighborhood.
Park City argues that its definition of what constitutes a "neighborhood" for the
purpose ofits analysis of the Bakers' application is an exercise of Park City's "zoning
9

Park City argues that the Bakers' argument for a consistent definition of
"neighborhood" "strips the City Council of the ability to define the boundaries of the
compatibility analysis." Brief, p. 24. The Bakers are arguing that Park City should be
prohibited from applying different standards to each subdivision application, including
inventing a new but vague parameter such as "compatibility with the direct
neighborhood."
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powers." Brief, p. 23 (arguing, "from a broad perspective, this argument [that the Bakers'
property should be permitted to resemble those across the street in Park Meadows] would
strip away the City Council's zoning powers ..."). Zoning powers are not in any way

~

implicated by the Bakers' application or their appeal of Park City's decision. Lot 83 was
already zoned and the proposed Plat Amendment complies with the zone.
Holiday Ranchettes and Park Meadows No. 5 are in the same zone and any
di:fferences in lot sizes are not the result of zoning. It is undisputed that the Bakers'
proposed amendment complies with all requirements of the zone. Therefore, it makes no
sense to claim that the Bakers are attempting to "strip away" Park City's zoning powers. As
quoted by Park City, the purpose of the zone for Lot 83 is to allow development that is
"compatible with existing developments" (note developments is plural and not limited to the
specific development or platted subdivision a property is part of) which compatibility
should be measured by compliance with the zoning regulations defined therein. See Brief,
p. 24. Having to demonstrate "good cause" to use a property in a manner that admittedly is
a permitted use and satisfies all density and size restrictions of the zone essentially turns a
permitted use into a conditional use.
Park City argues that it is over-reaching for the Bakers to argue that "existing
developments" should include comparison of developments within the same zone. Brief, p.
25. 10 The extension of Park City's argument is that it may treat each subdivision or
~

10

Park City mischaracterizes the Bakers' argument by expanding it to "require the
Council to consider every development in the City".
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perceived "neighborhood" as a separate zone for purposes of a compatibility analysis. See
Brief, pp. 23-25. Park City's real argument is that it should be allowed to do whatever it
wants without any judicial supervision whatsoever.
Park City had discretion in drawing its zoning map and could have created separate
zones for subdivisions such as Holiday Ranchettes and Park Meadows No. 5 (which it now
~

argues are very different from each other) if it intended for different zoning regulations to
apply to the subdivisions or view the areas as having different purposes. Because Park City
grouped the subdivisions into the same category through its zoning there is no legitimate
reason to now distinguish between the two. See Briefp. 23 (referring to the area generally
as "Park Meadows"), p. 29 (Park City again referring to the area as ''the Park Meadows
community.")
Evidence that the Holiday Ranchettes Subdivision's CC&R's prohibit other lots from
~

subdividing, the second category, is irrelevant. It is undisputed that the Bakers' lot is not
subject to any CC&R restrictions against subdivision. Park City previously stated that its
policy is that it does not enforce CC&R's. (R. 15, 121.) Park City's argument that
evidence of the Holiday Ranchettes' CC&R's supports denial of the Bakers' application is
contradictory to its position of non-enforcement and in essence enforces restrictions

~

contained in CC&Rs against property not subject to the restrictions simply because other
properties in the area are subject to the restrictions.
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Park City argues that ''the open space and ranch-style living convey a benefit to
properties in the subdivision that would be lost if their neighbors were split into smaller
lots." Brief, pp. 20, 30. Park City offers no support for this statement. There is no evidence

1;

that a single neighbor will lose their "open space 11 and ranch style living" if the Bakers, who
own one of only two lots that are not subject to restrictions against subdividing lots in
Holiday Ranchettes, are permitted to divided their lot in two.
Also irrelevant is Lot 83 's ambiguous history, the third category, which the Record
reflects purely speculative and which Park City did not purport to rely upon in denying the
Bakers' application. See supra, Response to Park City's Statement of the Case; (R. 14-17.)
Related to the historical intent argument, Park City implies that the Proposed Amendment
would result in material injury to the public and that denial thereof promotes the health,
safety and welfare 12 of Park City because "many property owners purchased [their
respective properties] in reliance on relative stasis in density and character of the nearby
properties." Brief, pp. 25-26, 28 ("To approve the plat amendment proposed by Appellants
would upset the expectations of all who developed nearby in reliance on the approved,
recorded subdivision plat ... Any concept of orderly development must include some
11

The Bakers are already permitted to diminish the "open space" on Lot 83 by
constructing a large barn that, for all intents and purposes, would create a similar
aesthetic effect as the construction of another home. See (R. 115.)
12
Park City argues that aesthetics are a component of health, safety and welfare and
implies that aesthetic considerations alone are enough to support a denial of a land use
application. Brief, p. 27. Park City, however, fails to cite to a single case supporting the
argument that aesthetics alone may support a denial, let alone in a case involving only
potential, de minimis aesthetic implications such as this case.
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~

notion of reasonable settled expectations."), 29 ("Appellants claiming a right to split their
lot in two vitiates all of the planning that went into the development."), 31.
First, Park City fails to cite to any evidence in the Record concerning the expectation
of neighbors that the Bakers' lot would not be developed or subdivided because there is no
such evidence. Second, any expectation of neighbors that the Bakers' lot would not be
subdivided is unreasonable as the approved, recorded subdivision plat makes clear that the
Bakers' lot is not subject to the CC&R's restriction against subdivision. Immediate
~

neighbors and the public at large have notice of this fact, as did the Bakers at the time of
choosing to purchase their property. Third, the "relative stasis in density and character of
the nearby properties" is not impacted by the addition of one single family home on a newly
created .4 acre lot located on Little Kate Road which includes properties of myriad sizes,
shapes and densities. 13
Last, the Bakers whole-heartedly agree with Park City's argument that orderly
development must include a notion of "reasonable settled expectations." See Brief, p. 27 fu
3 (citing Shahan v. Franklin Cnty., 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 929 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003))
Such expectations must be based on the restrictions or the lack thereof as a matter of record,
in conjunction with a set of clear, unifonnly applied rules governing land uses. Park City is

4w
13

Park City argues that the lots within Holiday Ranchettes "have a very distinct look,"
which the Proposed Amendment would be inconsistent with. Brief, p. 28. However, the
lots within Holiday Ranchettes are by no means uniform, ranging in size from .8 acre to
over 3 acres. (R. 69, R. 99). The four lots directly across the street from the Bakers' lot
range from .31 to .3 5 acres. (R. 99.) A golf course, the MARC and high-density
apartments are also located nearby on Little Kate road. (R. 15, 133.)
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not promoting orderly development by creating and applying new standards to individual
land use applications which are not found in the LMC, have not been, and will not be,
applied to other applications and are subject to abuse, favoritism and corruption.
The fourth category cited by Park City is its citizens' general "aversion" to increased
density. Brief, pp. 21-22. In denying the Bakers' application, Park City relied upon public
input provided during the process of amending the General Plan concerning broad policy
concerns that Park City residents do not favor "infill." Brief, pp. 21, 29. If Park City
desired to give effect to its citizens' aversion to subdivision it should have amended the
LMC and its zoning regulations to prohibit re-subdivision in all areas other than Bonanza
Park. Park City, however, failed to do so. Denial of the Bakers' application to divide their
lot in order to build one additional single family residence is administrative in nature, and it
was improper for Park City to deny the application based on perceived wide-spread policy
concerns rather than limit their review to the unique and specific circumstances of the
Bakers' application. Simply put, one more unit of housing is not the end of Park City as we
know it.

m.

In denying the Bakers' application Park City applied the wrong standard of
"Good Cause" and, therefore, acted illegally.

Utah Code§ 10-9a-609 (l)(a) provides that a land use authority may approve the
amendment of a plat if it finds that ''there is good cause for the ... amendment." (emphasis
added.) In denying the Bakers' application Park City determined that there was "good
cause" to deny or reject the application rather than focusing on whether there was "good
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cause" to approve. (R. 17, "There is Good Cause to deny the proposed plat amendment as
the plat does cause undo [sic] harm on adjacent property owners because the property is not
[sic]") (emphasis added); compare Brief, p. 34 (contrary to how Park City applied the
standard it argues that the LMC's "definition gives applicants a standard to evaluate
whether their application shows good cause.") (emphasis added.)
A standard requiring a showing of good cause to approve an application is different
from a standard requiring a showing of good cause to deny an application. See Woonsocket

Neighborhood Development Corp. v. Mathews, 2000 WL 1879903 (Sup. Ct. R.I., 2000)
(rather than consider factors demonstrating good cause to grant a requested extension the
land use authority "improperly recast the decision ... to support a determination of the
absence of good cause."); Berberian v. Petit, 374 A.2d 791 (R.I. 1977) (any doubt about the
existence of good cause generally should be resolved in favor of the party seeking to
establish good cause.) Park City considered only whether it could justify denial of the
Bakers' application and refused (even now on appeal) to consider "good cause" for
approval. See Brief, p. 31 ("Though Appellants may have come up with some good reasons
for approval in support of their application ... the City Council is tasked with weighing the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the proposed amendment" :further listing policy
concerns it believes support the denial.") Further, even if the standard of good cause to
deny the Bakers' application was proper, such good cause must be based on legally
sufficient reasons and not mere speculation or unsubstantiated concerns in the name of an
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exercise of discretion. See School Bd. of Osceola County v. UCP of Cent. Florida, 905
So.2d 909, 914 (5 th Dist. Ct. App FL, 2005) ("a denial based on good cause contemplates a
legally sufficient reason.")
IV.

Park City ignored "fundamental fairness" and the Bakers' private property
interests in its consideration of the Bakers' application.

Park City seemingly argues that Park City has complete discretion in applying any
sort of test to the Bakers' application, so long as it somehow utilizes the term "good cause"
and there is no evidence of "manifest unfairness, injustice, or bad faith" in the process.
Brief, pp. 30-32. This simply is not accurate. Applying an incorrect standard of good cause
- i.e., ignoring good cause for the Bakers' application and considering only potential factors
to support denial of the application - is illegal. It also completely disregards the
requirement under§ 10-9a-102(1)-(2) for "fundamental fairness" and that any and all of the
governmental goals espoused by Park City must be "balance[d] ... with a landowner's
private property interests." Utah Code§ 10-9a-102 (2) (emphasis added.)
Several members of the Park City Council apologized to the Bakers for the way their
application had been handled, noting an element of unfairness to the Bakers. (R. 52,

~

Council member Simpson, "I don't buy the neighborhood compatibility argument ... You
know, it just makes no sense to me ... I think, for me, there's a question of fairness. And if
the Baker's bought their lot with the understanding that they could subdivide it"); (R. 55,
Mayor Thomas, "it's troubling that it's been such an arduous process. It's troubling that
there may have been some see-saw through that process while the, the uh, general Plan was
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, being evolved and more public input. And you know, I'm sorry to see that you've gone
through such a difficult time with this."); (R. 54, Council member Beerman, "I find this one
challenging... I'm sorry the process has been so arduous for you guys. It's taken a long
time and it's been expensive. And I can understand why you 're frustrated on this."); (R. 49,
Council member Matsumoto, "I'm really sorry and apologetic for your bad process that you

. ")
... were given.
One example of unfairness is that the Bakers' application was accepted in
November, 2012, prior to the amendment of the General Plan. Park City, however, put the
application on hold while it worked through the General Plan amendment process, and then
requested additional (expensive) materials which resulted in a delay on the Bakers'
application for a period of almost two years. (K 30-31, 61.) And while Park City contends
that the Bakers' application was processed under the old General Plan, one of the primary
reasons the application was denied was based on anti-subdivision public input received
during the General Plan amendment process, which information was not applied to other
applications decided under the old General Plan. (R. 55-56.)
Park City's argument that it may completely disregard the interests of the Bakers in
the name of preventing potential (imagined), undefined aesthetic hann under the guise of
the "police power" runs contrary to the long recognized and almost sacred nature of the
right to use private property under Utah law and the express dictates ofMLUDMA. See
e.g., Brown v Sandy City Board ofAdjustment, 957 P.2d 207,210 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) and

32
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Patterson v Utah County Board ofAdjustment, 893 P .2d 602, 607 (Utah Ct. App 1995);

Utah Code§ 10-9a-102. Park City's argwnent should be rejected.
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